For two decades, Wisconsin courts have followed the approach to statutory interpretation established in State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. As noted in a recent blog post from Stafford Rosenbaum, that framework may soon change.
Kalal established a two-step methodology for interpreting statutes. Courts first examine the statute’s text using only “intrinsic sources”—the statute’s language, structure, purpose, and closely-related statutes. If the meaning appears clear, the inquiry ends. Only if the statute is ambiguous do courts proceed to Step Two, where they may consult “extrinsic sources” like legislative history.
The framework’s influence on Wisconsin law is substantial. As Professor Anuj C. Desai notes in a 2022 Wisconsin Law Review article, Kalal has been cited in published Wisconsin appellate decisions more than 1,200 times since it was decided—an average of once every six days for eighteen years.
Justice Abrahamson’s concurrence in Kalal serves as a veritable textbook on conducting legislative history research in Wisconsin. In fact, I’ve used it as a teaching tool in my courses, drawing on her list of various forms of history helpful in interpreting statutes.
A Criticism of Kalal
In a recent concurrence to SEIU Healthcare Wis. v. WERC, 2025 WI 29, Justice Dallet, joined by three other justices, called for the Court to reevaluate Kalal. She criticized the framework’s two-step structure as illogical and argued that its formalistic requirements distract from determining what statutes actually mean.
While the concurrence expressly stated it was not overruling Kalal, it may be a signal that a majority of the Court is ready to restructure or potentially displace the framework entirely. Stafford Rosenbaum’s blog post provides an excellent analysis of Justice Dallet’s criticisms and their implications.
Petition to “Revisit and Modify” Kalal
On August 21, 2025, the Wisconsin Labor & Industry Review Commission (LIRC) filed a petition asking the Court to “revisit and modify” Kalal. The petition arises from Abby Windows, LLC v. Labor & Indus. Rev. Comm’n, 2025 WI App 50.
According to Stafford Rosenbaum
LIRC’s petition presents as appropriate a vehicle as any for revisiting and modifying Kalal. The court of appeals’ opinion highlights Justice Dallet’s criticisms of Kalal, including Kalal’s arbitrary distinctions and the difficulties of applying its framework. And the panoply of relevant sources of meaning identified above would be useful in illustrating any new methodology. It is entirely possible that the Court could grant LIRC’s petition, retain Kalal, and reverse the court of appeals’ opinion by concluding that it simply misapplied Kalal’s framework (an argument LIRC also makes in its petition). Either way, a decision on the petition is imminent and, if granted, practitioners should expect new guidance on statutory interpretation this term.